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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
Vol. 53

JUNE 1955

No. 8

The Michigan Law Review presents in this issue six articles reviewing the most interesting and significant chapters of the Report
of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws (March 31, 1955). The editors of the Review hope
that these critiques, prepared by teachers and practitioners in
the antitrust field, will be a useful guide to the contents of the
Report and will serve as a point of departure for further discussion
of the committee's work.
BASIC ANTITRUST CONCEPTS

Kenneth S. Carlston*
is the function of this paper to summarize and evaluate chapter I
of the Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to
Study the Antitrust Laws. It will first be necessary to note briefly the
circumstances attendant upon the appointment of the committee, its
delegated function, its conception of its task and its working methods.
No helpful critique of its accomplishments can be made unless its
purpose and mode of operation are taken as the starting point. While
many tasks remain to be done in the study of the antitrust laws, the
committee's work should be appraised only from the standpoint of the
tasks which it set for itself. After such a recapitulation of the history
of the committee, there will be set forth a series of black-letter statements summarizing the conclusions reached by the committee in chapter I, together with an explanatory or critical comment on each.
When Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., indicated his intention to create the committee, he expressed the view that its goal
would be to provide "a thoughtful and comprehensive study of our
antitrust laws." In the view of the President of the United States, the
committee's function was to aid in "modernizing and strengthening our
laws to preserve American free enterprise against monopoly and unfair
competition." In the view of the committee itself, a principal task would
be to examine the large body of antitrust doctrine as developed by the
courts and other agencies of the federal government. Such an ex-
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arnination would fall into three parts: (I) analysis, (2) evaluation
and (3) conclusions and recornrnendations.1
The committee comprised fifty-nine wor~ng rnernbers,2 of whom
about four-fifths were lawyers and law professors and the remainder
economists. The stated aim in their selection "was to gather men who
reflect interacting views on issues of antitrust policy."3 The committee was divided into work groups corresponding generally to the topics
taken up in the several chapters of the Report. The functioning of
the work groups and the entire committee is a rather remarkable example of the group process as an instrument for achieving consensus.
Given individual members vitally interested in reaching the group
goal, subjected to a process of study, education, interchange of views,
and those psychological pressures implicit in the performance of the
role of a participant in a group endeavor such as this, including the
minimizing of attitudes of advocacy and the corning to the fore of attitudes of respect, adjustment, cooperation and desire to reach the
group goal of consensus and a useful contribution, an unusual degree
of unanimity of viewpoint was reached in the Report.
Chapter I of the Report is concise, clear and reveals a rather considerable number of legal propositions which have been developed
over the years by judicial construction of the Sherman Act. This phase
of the Report is largely codification of the law in the sense of restatement rather than attempts markedly to influence the development of
the law in new channels. While many of the sentences of the Report
might well have been printed as black-letter formulations of rules of
law, some may feel that the Report could have usefully gone farther
in this direction. That is to say, at numerous points the reader has
to formulate his own impression of the nature of the propositions being
advanced by the committee by drawing from the contents of several
paragraphs or pages. Perhaps consensus could not have been reached
if the committee had tried to go farther toward pointing up its remarks
and making more explicit the general propositions or rules which are
implicit in its discussions. Nevertheless, such a procedure would have
been helpful to the reader and for that reason, among others, will be
followed in the present article.
1 REPORT oP THE ATTORNEY GENllRAL's NATIONAL CoMMI'ITEB TO STUDY THE
.ANnntusT LAws, March 31, 1955, pp. iv, 3 (hereinafter cited as REPORT, followed by the
page number). Page numbers in the text refer to the Report.
2 There were 61 named members but two did not participate in the deliberations.
8 REPORT iv.
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The Rule of Reason

I. The policy of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act is to eliminate situations in which competition is unduly limited. (p. 11)
2. The Rule of Reason in the application of the Sherman Act
"permits the courts to decide whether conduct is signi-ficantly and unreasonably anticompetitive in character or effect." (p. 11)
Comment. The committee regards the Standard Oil case,4 as reaffirmed by the American T ohacco case,5 as laying the foundation for
the judicial application of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The
Report contains an extended discussion of these two decisions but, unfortunately, only a most abbreviated discussion of the Rule of Reason.
The Report in subsequent pages discusses the application of the Rule
of Reason in the several types of situations in which it has arisen. This
is indeed the only context in which the Rule of Reason can be usefully
discussed. Reason in the abstract is a whimsical augur of results; it
furnishes -no workable guide upon which to predict judicial behavior or
to decide specific fact situations. In the language of the early common
law judge, it must be "right reason," that is to say, it must be the
judicial process at work in its procedures of fact determination, fact
analysis, fact classification, weighing of competing values and search
for workable rules of conduct which will smoothly and efficiently fit
into the functioning of society. Hence the Rule of Reason attains
significance only as it is viewed in the context of specific fact problems
or disputes.
Yet the general dissent of Louis B. Schwartz, appearing at the end
of the Report, is illustrative of the current confusion concerning the
approach to the antitrust laws which the Rule of Reason is intended
to identify as a shorthand expression. It has become the battleground
of extremists. On the one hand, defendants' counsel Hy to it as a new
refuge promising a more secure shelter than, say, the shrapnel-ridden
Appalachian Coals case. 6 On the other hand, supporters of a rigid
application of per se illegality doctrines would destroy it, regarding it
as a citadel for the protection of powerful defendants and a barrier
against the expansion of per se illegality.7
When the Supreme Court moved from the common law context
of control of agreements in restraint of trade,8 in a construction of the
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S.Ct. 502 (1911).
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 31 S.Ct. 632 (1911).
6 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 53 S.Ct. 471 (1933).
7 E.g., general dissent of Louis B. Schwartz, REPORT 390-392.
8Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711).
4
11

1036

MmmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 53

Sherman Act as prohibiting all restraints of trade, 9 to a context in
which it could examine and develop means of control for the complex
market relationships and practices of an industrial civilization, as it did
in the Standard Oil case,1° it took a step in judicial administration for
which a modem parallel may be the Segregation Cases.11 Chief Justice
Hughes called the Sherman Act "a charter of freedom" having "a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in
constitutional provisions." The act "set up the essential standard of
reasonableness."12 It was for the courts to determine the meaning of
that standard in specific cases. Just as the Segregation Cases announced a policy decision later to be implemented by specific regulations, so the Standard Oil case announced a general approach to the
application of the Sherman Act which later decisions were to make
explicit. These later decisions, in tum, under the rule of stare decisis,
would become the repository of a continually developing body of law
in which specific propositions or rules were constantly being tested as
they were applied to new fact situations. Sometimes a prior decision
was found to be applicable, sometimes not; sometimes the rule of the
prior decision needed to be reformulated and a new distinction made.
The immemorial problem of stare decisis was under the Sherman Act
cast in new terms as a conflict between the Rule of Reason and illegality
per se.
The judicial process must always operate as a system of classification, as a search for a general rule and a classification of the case at
hand as in or out of the general rule. It must always establish a
dichotomy. The dichotomy of reasonableness under the Standard
Oil case in itself furnishes no guide for decision; it merely furnishes a
method of approach. The workable dichotomy is the specific rule,
whatever it may be, developed in the specific fact situation in which
the Rule of Reason is ostensibly applied. Hence, the rule that price
fixing agreements are illegal is a rule which has a high-predictability
value but it is nevertheless a rule which must always be approached in
the light of the specific fact situation before the court. When such an
agreement is merely part of a larger situation in which it is an incidental
means to achieve socially desirable ends, it may well yet be sustained13
despite the strictures of the Socony-Vacuum case.14
9 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight' Assn., 166 U.S. 290 at 331-332, 17 S.Ct.
540 (1897).
10 221 U.S. 1, 31 S.Ct. 502 (1911).
11 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954).
12 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 at 359-360, 53 S.Ct. 471
(1933).
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It is believed preferable to employ the dichotomy of lawful-unlawful instead of that of reasonable-unreasonable, which is often used in
the Report to indicate the probable relevant judicial behavior. The
inquiry here is the usual one of determining the lawfulness of certain
types of conduct in the light of precedent. Little purpose is served
in casting such predictions in terms of reasonableness instead of
specific rules of law. Although the next heading herein refers to illegality per se, discussion thereunder will be of specific propositions
advanced in the Report, and their application, all on the basis of the
lawfulness of the conduct under consideration.
Illegality per se; Section 1 of the Act
3. Certain forms of conduct may be "'conclusively presumed to
'he illegal, by reason of their nature or their necessary effect.' " (p.11)
4. When arrangements are found to exist which control price,
either directly or by controlling production, they are unreasonable per
se and further inquiry under the Rule of Reason ceases. (p. 12)
5. Whether such arrangements in fact exist may require an inquiry into their purposes as well as their effect. ( p. 14) Such an inquiry may reveal agreements (pp. 14-15), types of distributive
methods (pp. 15-16), market support (pp. 16-17) and activities of
trade associations (pp. 17-22) designed to affect prices in a desired
manner.

Comment. The careful analysis necessary to determine whether
specific conduct is to be condemned as price fixing is set forth in the
Report. Often the manner in which the market functions must be
investigated in order to determine whether the conduct in question will
have the prohibited effect. Resale price maintenance agreements are
to be condemned as impairing competition even though they are confined to the fixing of prices in the distribution of a single producer's
goods15 instead of a horizontal price fixing agreement as in the Trenton
Potteries case.16
Conduct falling short of direct price fixing may nevertheless have
that effect. Particular types of distributive methods may have no real
business justification other than to achieve control over price determination by others by means which may be regarded as an abuse of other13 United States v. Morgan, (D.C. N.Y. 1953) 118 F. Supp. 621; Board of Trade
of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 38 S.Ct. 242 (1918).
14 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60 S.Ct. 811 (1940).
t5Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 31 S.Ct. 376
(1911).
16 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 47 S.Ct. 377 (1927).
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wise legal privileges. Measures of control by a manufacturer which
pervert his privilege to refuse to sell to others1 7 into an instrument of
constraint having the effect of an agreement to maintain resale prices
will be condemned.18 Conduct having no other purpose than that of
affecting prices and in fact accomplishing that end will be illegal.19
Trade associations of manufacturers are privileged to collect, analyze
and distribute market information, such as sales, shipments and prices,20
but when this privilege is exercised in such a manner as to inhibit free
price competition among members and to conduce to the establishment
of market prices other than those which unfettered competition would
produce the conduct ceases to be privileged.21 A multiple basing point
system will become unlawful when it is used as a means to eliminate
competition as to price, quality or terms of sale and when adherence
thereto by recalcitrants was enforced by collective sanctions such as
reprisals or boycotts.22

6. Practices not directly fixing prices but nevertheless influencing
the processes of price formation will be examined to determine,
among other things, whether such practices have a primary or a merely
incidental effect upon prices. (pp. 23-24)
Comment. Conduct may not involve price fixing but may affect
price formation. In such case, the lawfulness of the conduct in question will depend upon the relative significance of the competition
eliminated as a result of the conduct as compared with its other purposes or effects. An analysis must be made of the total situation in
which the measure of control of the processes of price formation is used
in order to determine whether it is employed by the defendants to inhibit free competition in the market or is instead used to promote effective competition. 23
7. When agreements among competitors for the division of
markets are found to exist, they are unreasonable per se. (p. 26)
Comment. The Report points out that agreements among actual
or potential competitors not to compete in specified territories or for
11 United

States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 39 S.Ct. 465 (1919).

1s F.T.C. v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 42 S.Ct. 150 (1922).
19 United States v.
20 Maple Flooring

Socony-Vacuum Oil Corp., 310 U.S. 150, 60 S.Ct. 8II (1940).
Manufacturers Assn. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 45 S.Ct.
578 (1925); Cement Manufacturers Protective Assn. v. United States, 268 U.S. 588, 45
S.Ct. 586 (1925).
21 American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 42 S.Ct. 114
(1921); Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 56 S.Ct. 629 (1936).
22F.T.C. v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 68 S.Ct. 793 (1948).
23 Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 38 S.Ct. 242 (1918);
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 53 S.Ct. 471 (1933).
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specified customers obviously eliminate competition and hence are unlawful. Although the cases which have so far arisen of this nature
have involved competitiors who as a group possessed substantial, and
often dominant, market power, and hence necessarily would have a
significant effect upon competition in the market, the Report states
that a simple market division should be held unlawful. 24
8. Agreements providing for exclusive territorial dealership will
be unlawful if they are part of an attempt to monopolize or an unreasonable restraint of trade. An exclusive dealership which is merely an
ancillary restraint reasonably necessary to serve or protect a main lawful business purpose of the parties and does not in fact unreasonably
foreclose competition from the dealer's market should be upheld.
(pp. 27-29)
Comment. An agreement by a manufacturer with a distributor
not to create another distributorship within a defined area would, as a
matter of pure logic, be classified as an agreement in restraint of trade
and hence unlawful. The distributor in such an agreement will
usually agree to purchase only from the manufacturer but this question
is only incidentally touched upon at this point, being reserved for
chapter IV. The Report moves from the area of pure logic, however,
to that of reality in its discussion of this problem.
From the standpoint of organizational structure, an exclusive dealer
can be regarded to be somewhat within the manufacturer's organization. He is part of the manufacturer's established channels of distribution. His purchases are usually institutionalized in a supply contract of some duration. His sales behavior will to a certain extent reHect established policies of the manufacturers. The business advantages of the exclusive dealership will influence to a considerable extent de facto acceptance of the supplier's authority. The analogy
which the Report finds to exist between the merger cases and exclusive
dealerships is, accordingly, well-founded.
The legality of exclusive territorial dealerships involves an inquiry
into whether they are resorted to for their advantages as a distributive
method and whether their effect is not unreasonably to foreclose competition from the dealer's market. The Report reaches the conclusion
that " 'to determine reasonableness under Section I' of exclusive distributorships, it seems relevant to focus, as the Court suggested in
Columbia Steel25 and reiterated in Times-Picayune, 26 on [I] 'the perUREPORT 26.
211 United States

(1948).

v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 at 523-524, 68 S.Ct. 1107
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centage of business controlled, [2] the strength of remaining competition, [and, 3] whether the action springs from business requirements
or purpose to monopolize. > "27

Special Problems in Proof of Conspiracy

9. An unlawful conspiracy to monopolize trade may exist solely
between a corporation and its officers or between officers acting on its
behalf, but not a conspiracy to restrain trade. (pp. 30-31)
IO. A conspiracy to restrain trade between a parent and subsidiary
corporations or between subsidiary corporations is not unlawful when
the effect of the restraint is confined to the corporate family; it is unlawful when the concerted action restrains the trade of strangers to the
corporate family. (pp. 31-34) When effective control of the voting
stock of two or more corporations is held by a single individual or
group of individuals, the relationship involved shall, for the purpose
of the foregoing, be treated as equivalent to a parent-subsidiary relation.
(p. 35) Some question exists whether the distinction noted in the first
sentence above should be made and whether a single business enterprise whose legal structure takes the form of two or more corporations
should be treated differently under the law from one whose legal structure is confined to a single corporation. (p. 35)
Comment. The Report comes to grips with two of the most currently debated problems in the field of conspiracy under the Sherman
Act, namely, that of intra-enterprise conspiracy and of "conscious parallelism." The above propositions 9 and IQ set forth the committee's con:clusions on the first of these problems while proposition 11 below
deals with the second problem.
The discussion of intra-enterprise conspiracy is most careful and
thoughtful. The essential philosophy of this phase of the Report is
that the doctrine needs to be clarified and its proper limits more precisely defined. This the Report does. Apparently some members of the
committee, with whom the writer is in accord, feel that the doctrine is
purely of a formal rather than a substantive character. They would
urge that when otherwise no liability under section I would exist for
a company doing business through branches, divisions or departments,
it is wholly unreal to impose liability merely by virtue of the fact that
it employs subsidiaries instead.28
26 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 at 615, 73 S.Ct.
872 (1953), quoting and citing United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 at
527, 68 S.Ct. 1107 (1948).
27REPonT 28.
2 8 REPORT 35.
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Problems of corporate structure should arise under the Sherman
Act only as subsidiaries become instrumentalities to forbidden ends.29
The solution which the Report adopts for the purpose of stating the
applicable law on this point may, in last analysis, coincide with the
view just stated. The Report makes a distinction between restraints
affected within and outside the corporate family. The statement is
made that "concerted action between a parent and subsidiary or between subsidiaries which has for its purpose or effect coercion or unreasonable restraint on the trade of strangers to those acting in concert
is prohibited by Section I. . . . Where such concerted action restrains
no trade and is designed to restrain no trade other than that of the
parent and its subsidiaries, Section I is not violated."30
The Report accordingly accepts the doctrine of intra-enterprise
conspiracy and would stop its further expansion by excluding from its
application such manifestations of policy within a corporate family as
the fixing of marketing territories or prices. This is certainly a step
in the right direction, for the doctrine itself is an anomalous one which
makes conduct unlawful when it is performed by a business enterprise
organized as a group of fictional legal personalities under a single control and yet permits the very same conduct to be lawful when it is performed by a business enterprise organized in a single corporation. It
is stated in the Report that: "Some members feel . . . that in no instance can a parent and its subsidiary be held guilty of an offense that
must be committed by more than one person. Since there would
concededly be no liability under Section I, if a company does business
through unincorporated branches, divisions or departments, they believe it is wholly unreal to impose liability where it employs subsidiaries instead. To distinguish between these types of operations,
they feel, is to sacrifice substance for mere form." 31
The substitution of individual stockholderships of two or more
corporations for ownership by a parent corporation is seen to make
no change in the foregoing analysis. The Report states: "Where
more than a majority of voting capital stock in two or more corporations
is lawfully owned by the same individual with the remainder held by
noncompetitors only for investment, the situation is clearly equivalent
to a parent-subsidiary relation." 32
29 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 31 S.Ct. 632 (1911);
United States v. National Lead Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 513, affd. 332 U.S.
319, 67 S.Ct. 1634 (1947); United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., (D.C.
N.Y. 1951) 100 F. Supp. 504.
30 REPORT 34.
31 REPORT 35.
32 Ibid.
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The issue of de facto control of subsidiaries by minority stockholders as against inactive majority ownership is not raised. In this
connection, Professor Kindleberger has made certain observations with
respect to the control of foreign subsidiaries which apply to the problem of corporate control generally. He states: "The question of control bristles with legal and practical difficulties. . . . Practically, the
question is where decisions are made and orders come from. Here all
sorts of possible shadings are found. A small but cohesive minority of
foreigners may operate the corporation, despite a wide majority of national ownership."33
The locus of corporate control is a question of fact. Majority
ownership will usually be probative of that fact. But the exercise of
control may be proved by other facts. The writer has stated elsewhere: "The question of the locus of authority is more than a purely
legal question; it is a question of human behavior, of the extent to
which authority is asserted and accepted."34 The formally prescribed
center of decision:..making is not necessarily the center at which authority is in fact exercised.
The unlikelihood of expecting compliance with a decree requiring
wholly-owned affiliates to compete is strongly pointed out in the Report.
The decree in the Timken case, "requiring competition among companies now fully controlled by American Timken, sacrifices substance
to form .... [S]ince stock ownership constituted the essence of the
combination, the obvious remedy should have been dissolution...."3 is
This comment has so far been directed to proposition IO above,
since it strikes at the heart of the problem of intra-enterprise conspiracy, at least from the standpoint of the functioning of the business
enterprise. Proposition 9 above deals with the special problem raised
by the possibility, under the law, of a conspiracy solely between a corporation and its officers or between its officers on its behalf. The reasoning of the Report on this problem seems highly conceptualistic and
is strictly a legal analysis of the issue involved.
The legal personality of the corporate organization is a legal fiction
made necessary by the fact that the organization as a functioning social
group exhibits the behavior of individuals carrying out their respective
corporate roles under the authority of the directing personnel of the
group. Whether the group is large or small it is a social fact and its
action must be brought under the domain of law. For the most part,
33 KINDLEBERGBR, lNTBRNATIONAL EcoNoMics 346 (1953).
34 Carlston, "Antitrust Policy Abroad," 49 N.W. Umv. L. REv.
35 REPORT 36.

713 at 722 (1955).
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the fiction of legal personality works reasonably in according the group
the necessary protection under the law and imposing upon it the
obligations which all participants in the processes of society must recognize under the law. The antitrust laws represent a body of law
in the administration of which the courts have generally come to recognize that they are dealing with a special type of group action, namely, the organization or the institution, and have required that data be
submitted to them for the purposes of decision-making which will show
the extent of the organizational power of the defendant, the types of
market relations established by it, and the impact of its behavior upon
the market. Responsibility is imposed upon the corporate organization by virtue of the fact that the organization, as a corporate body, is
held accountable for its torts and its crimes. At the same time, the
individual member or members of the corporate organization who committed the acts in question in the performance of their corporate roles
do not escape personal responsibility for their legal consequences merely because they were so performed. The Report laid down the rule
in this connection that when a corporation commits a substantive
crime, its officers and directors who participated therein are guilty of
criminal conspiracy.36
Starting from the premise set forth in the last sentence, the Report
by unassailable logic reaches the conclusion that since monopolization
is a substantive offense under section 2 and since a corporation which
monopolizes in violation of section 2 commits a substantive offense,
its officers and directors responsible therefor "may be guilty of a
conspiracy to monopolize under that section."37 The Report then
makes the distinction above noted between (1) the offense of restraint
of trade and (2) a contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of
trade, and points out that a mere restraint of trade is not a substantive
offense under section 1. Confining its analysis strictly to the latter
concept of restraint of trade and bearing in mind that restraint of trade
by a corporation is not itself a substantive offense, the conclusion is
reached that a conspiracy by a corporation's officers acting on its behalf
to restrain trade will not be a conspiracy in violation of section 1. The
cases are said to be in accord with this proposition. Two decisions
which may be argued to be opposed38 are distinguished on the ground
36 REPORT 30, citing Barron v. United States, (1st Cir. 1925) 5 F. (2d) 799; Mininsohn v. United States, (3d Cir. 1939) 101 F. (2d) 477; Egan v. United States, (8th
Cir. 1943) 137 F. (2d) 369, cert. den. 320 U.S. 788, 64 S.Ct. 195 (1943).
37 REPORT 30.
38 Patterson v. United States, (6th Cir. 1915) 222 F. 599, cert. den. 238 U.S. 635,
35 S.Ct. 939 (1915); White Bear Theatre Corp. v. State Theatre Corp., (8th Cir. 1942)
129 F. (2d) 600.
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that violations of section 2 were charged in both cases, "thus making
unnecessary to the result the brief discussion of the applicability of
Section 1 to these facts. Where there is no charge of violating Section 2, coupled with the Section 1 charge, the only reported decisions
on the question have found no conspiracy in restraint of trade in joint
action solely between a corporation and its officers acting on its behalf."39
Certain difficulties are encountered in the acceptance of this logic
as a guide for judicial decision. In the :first place, there are no federal
common law crimes; the only federal crimes are those which are constitutionally enacted by Congress.40 Officers and directors of a corporation can be guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime only when a
federal statute so provides. In each of the cases cited in the Report
for the proposition that officers and directors who participate in the
commission of a crime by a corporation are guilty of conspiracy, there
was a statute expressly making such a conspiracy an offense.41 The
:first of the cited cases raises the issue of aiding and abetting as a statutory offense and the remaining two raise the issue of whether the conduct amounted to a prohibited conspiracy. In all cases, including
those arising under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, the :first question to be answered is whether the statute in question prohibits conspiracy. Section 1 expressly prohibits conspiracies in restraint of
trade and section 2 expressly prohibits conspiracies to monopolize. The
,circumstance that monopolizing is also a substantive offense under section 2 is thought to be utterly irrelevant. We are not here concerned
with the general offense of conspiracy under the federal statute.42
The only question at issue is the interpretation of the term conspiracy
as used in sections 1 and 2 and application of these sections to concerted action by a corporation and its officers. Inasmuch as the corporation is a legal :fiction, whether legal responsibility will be imputed
to it will depend upon the conduct of its officers. If they are personally guilty of a conspiracy to defraud the United States and have used
the corporation as an instrumentality to that end, they will be guilty
of an illegal conspiracy under the conspiracy statute and their guilty
intent may be imputed to their corporation as well. 43 The writer is in
agreement with the view of the Report that the cases arising under
39 REPORT 31, citing Nelson Radio &: Supply Co. v. Motorola, (5th Cir. 1952) 200
F. (2d) 911, cert. den. 345 U.S. 925, 73 S.Ct. 783 (1953); Marion County Co-op. Assn.
v. Carnation Co., (D.C. Ark. 1953) 114 F. Supp. 58.
40 United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 31 (1812); United
States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677 at 687, 12 S.Ct. 764 (1892).
41 Note 36 supra.
42 18 u.s.c. (1952) §371.
43 Mininsohn v. United States, (3d Cir. 1939) IOI F. (2d) 477.
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section 2 were rightly decided in holding that there could be no conspiracy to monopolize solely between a corporation and its officers. He
is also in agreement with its conclusion that a similar result should be
reached in section I cases. In both cases, however, he would place
this result on the ground of interpretation of the term conspiracy as
used in the statute and he would not rule out the possibility in either
section 1 or 2 that a group of corporate officers could engage in a
prohibited conspiracy from the consequences of which the corporate
entity would not shield them under the :fiction that they were acting
as a single person. The question is solely one of statutory interpretation of the provisions prohibiting conspiracy in both sections I and 2
in the light of the general law relating to conspiracy. What is clearly
to be condemned is any tendency to use the fiction of the corporate
legal personality as a means for subjecting to punishment conduct by
corporate officers which would be otherwise legal. The evil is at best
only inferentially raised in the Report.
11. "Conscious parallelism," in the sense of uniform business
behavior knowingly carried out, is evidence of, but not an equivalent
of, conspiracy. Its probative value of conspiracy will vary case by
case. (pp. 36-40)

Comment. The Report indicates the elusiveness of the term "conscious parallelism." It points out that the word "conscious" may only
import ''knowledge that a particular course of conduct has been followed by competitors." The word "parallelism" may refer to "collusion" or merely "uniformity of business behavior." Proof of uniform
business behavior knowingly carried out by the members of a group of
competitors is not, in the view of the committee, sufficient proof of an
illegal combination or conspiracy though it may be introduced as
evidence thereof for consideration with other proof.
The problem from the legal standpoint is one of the weight to be
accorded evidence of this nature in the light of the relevant precedents.
The problem from the economics standpoint is that of determining
whether managerial decisions in response to the stimuli of market conditions are motivated by considerations of benefit to the individual enterprise or to a group of enterprises. If short-term desiderata are regarded to be the more important, then departures from uniform business behavior may be more readily expected. If long-term considerations are given precedence, then there may be a greater likelihood of
adherence to the common behavior patterns of others. Moreover, the
informed business judgment of managerial groups may very well tend
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to coincide given a substantial .identity of the data upon which they
are predicated. All this reinforces the conclusion that a judgment
reached either by legal or economic reasoning will be difficult to arrive at and to support persuasively. The Report correctly concludes
that: " 'Conscious parallelism' is not a blanket equivalent of conspiracy. Its probative value in establishing the ultimate fact of conspiracy will vary case by case. Proof of agreement, express or implied,
is still indispensable to the establishment of a conspiracy under the
antitrust laws."44
A number of the members of the committee concurred in a statement by Professor Rostow dealing with the problem of uniform behavior by a small number of companies which together substantially
occupy a market. It was said, "In appropriate cases, such evidence
[of interdependent behavior] that economic power has in fact been
combined in the pricing process may legitimately permit broader inferences as to the knowledge of participants, and the degree to which
their actions were consciously concerted."45
As a final point, the Report notes that mere membership in a trade
association, whose officers had conspired with some members to violate the antitrust laws, should not result in a blanket finding of "guilt
by membership."46

12. "Monopolizing under section 2 consists of monopoly in the
economic sense-that is, power to fix prices or to exclude competition
-plus a carefully limited ingredient of purpose to use or preserve
such power. Economic monopoly becomes illegal monopolization not
only (1) if it was achieved or preserved by conduct violating section
1 but also (2) if it was, even by restrictions not prohibited by section
1, deliberately obtained or maintained. This element of 'deliberateness' or 'purpose,' distinguishing economic monopoly from the offenses
of monopolization, differs from the more demanding concept of 'specific intent' relevant where the offense alleged is an attem1t to monopoJize." (p. 43)
13. Monopoly exists when a single seller, or a group of sellers
acting in concert, has the power to control market price or to exclude
competition. (pp. 43-44) Unlawful monopoly exists when such power
exists and is coupled with the purpose or intent to exercise it. (pp. 43-

44, 55)
44 REPORT 39. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346
U.S. 537 at 540-541, 74 S.Ct. 257 (1954), is cited in support of this conclusion.
45 REPORT 42.
46 Ibid.
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Comment. The development of the law of monopoly under section 2 of the Sherman Act has been inB.uenced by a number of forces
not necessarily apparent on the face of the decisions.
1. The Sherman Act is essentially a regulatory statute cast in the
form of a penal statute. Rules which might otherwise be desirable as
a matter of economic policy toward preserving competition may nevertheless raise issues of policy under the criminal law which would cause
the courts to shrink from applying them.
2. In this atmosphere it has been difficult until recently for the
courts to regard questions of market structure in the same manner as
questions of market behavior. So long as mere market position was
regarded in static instead of dynamic terms, which is the point of view
implicit in the United States Steel case that "the law does not make
mere size an offense,"47 it was impossible for the courts to leap the
hurdle that the numerical or relative quantity of market transactions
of a single firm could, without more, result in a criminal act.
3. The language of section 2 itself operates to reinforce the point
of view indicated in the preceding paragraph, since that which is
prohibited is not monopoly but monopolizing.
4. The criminal law setting of the Sherman Act has brought it
about that problems of proof and evidence which would be difficult
enough in a regulatory statute of such a wide scope are enormously
multiplied when it becomes necessary to prove criminal intent and
abuse of power. Hence the continual search of the courts for formulas
of decisions and procedures of trial which would simplify and expedite
the task of judicial administration.
5. The courts have become growingly aware that the doctrine of
conspiracy was not always a practical means for dealing with problems
of dominant market power achieved by a small group of sellers consciously coordinating, though not through agreement, their marketing
policies so as to achieve the advantages of oligopoly or monopoly.
The Report begins its study of the monopoly problem first by defining monopoly as set forth in propositions 12 and 13 above and then
by proceeding to analyze the constituent elements of the concept of
monopoly as thus defined. These elements are (1) the determination
of the relevant market, (2) the amount of market power needed to
constitute monopoly, and (3) the existence of the necessary "purpose"
47 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 at 451, 40 S.Ct. 293
(1920). Accord, United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 at 708, 47
S.Ct. 748 (1927).
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or "deliberateness" required to make monopoly into the offense of monopolizing. The Report concludes this phase of its study with the
special problem on the defense of monopoly upon the ground that it
has been "thrust upon" the defendant. The Report thereafter proceeds to the problems of monopoly obtained by combination and of
attempts and conspiracies to monopolize.
It should be realized that section 2 uses the verb "monopolize" to
describe the prohibited conduct and does not in terms prohibit the
mere status of monopoly or monopolization. Possibly the most important judicial landmarks in the modem construction of the Sherman
Act were the decisions which resulted in establishing as sufficient proof
of monopolizing (I) the existence under the control of a single seller,
or a group of sellers acting in concert, the power to control market
prices or exclude competition, together with (2) the purpose to use
or preserve such power. 48 The second element is largely a formal one.
As Judge Hand himself states, the "distinction is ... purely formal;
. . . it would disappear as soon as the monopoly began to operate; for,
when it did-that is, as soon as it began to sell at all-it must sell at
some price and the only price at which it could sell is a price which
it itself fixed. Thereafter the power and its exercise must needs coalesce. "49 Upon this foundation the Report adopts the definition of
monopoly power set forth in proposition 13 above.
14. 'Whether monopoly power for purposes of section 2 exists
requires -first a de-finition of the market within which it is to be measured. ... For these purposes, the market is normally identi-fied both
in terms of the trade in products, -field or services affected by the conduct, and the geographical areas within which such trade may be
limited." (pp. 44-45) "The appropriate market is the 'area of effective
competition' within which the defendant or defendants operate." (p.
44)
Comment. It should be noted that proposition 13 above makes
it necessary to establish not only the existence of the power to control
market price or to exclude competition but the possession of that power
in the hands of a single seller or a group of sellers acting in concert.
The problem of identifying such a single seller will ordinarily raise
no special difficulties but when shall a group of sellers be segregated
48 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 66 S.Ct. 1125 (1946);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416.
49 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416 at
428.
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out or classified as possessing such power? This question was raised
in the American Tobacco Co. case but the Report does not enter upon
an examination of this question except in general terms under proposition 20 below. The first question which the Report takes up in exploring the constituent elements of the term "monopolize," as construed under the American Tobacco Co. and Alcoa cases, is that of the
determination of the relevant market.
The focal point of the Sherman Act is the preservation of competition. Section 2 is designed to ensure that no one supplier or group
of suppliers shall be unduly shielded from competition. To employ
a certain concept from the field of psychology by way of illustration,
section 2 is designed to ensure that the space of free movement or the
area of freedom in decision-making of each supplier is always subject
to the pressure of rivals seeking to reach the same goal. The concept
of the market tends, therefore, to be approached by the courts in the
Sherman Act cases from the standpoint of the seller or sellers. The
concept is, however, a relational one, for it involves a relation between
sellers and buyers. Ideally there should be rivalry among buyers as
well as rivalry among sellers so that each transaction involves an exercise of choice by the parties on both sides of the equation.
It will be observed that the Report approaches the definition of
the market primarily from the standpoint of the classification of sellers
and the determination of the competitive pressures to which they are
in fact subjected and the effect of their decisions upon those of other
sellers. The Report states: "Identification of markets required for solution of an antitrust problem is primarily one of fact. The starting point
is to ascertain the actual competition to which the defendants are exposed, and the effect on rivals of the conduct they have undertaken.
For these purposes, the market is normally identified both in terms of
the trade in products, field or services affected by the conduct, and the
geographical areas within which such trade may be limited."110 The
Report then quotes with approval the statement of the Supreme Court
that the Sherman Act has geographical and distributive significance,
and it applies "to any part of the United States as distinguished from
the whole and to any part of the classes of things forming a part of
interstate commerce."111 Yet this quotation merely sets the stage for
investigation. What criteria shall govern the selection of the product
or products whose market shall be the framework for determining the
44-45.
45, citing Indiana Farmer's Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publishing Co., 293 U.S. 268 at 279, 55 S.Ct. 182 (1934).
50 REPORT
51 REPORT

1050

MmmGAN LAw REVIEW

[ Vol. 53

extent of competition among sellers? What criteria shall govern the
determination of the geographical limits of a market? The answer to
these two questions will be the subject matter of propositions 15 and
16 below.
15. The determination of the relevant market will include the
market for substitute commodities if these are procurable by more than
a limited number of buyers within reasonable variations in prices. (pp.
46-47)
Comment. The Report recognizes that the concept of the market
also raises a problem in the classification of buyers as well as sellers,
and that the competitive pressures to which a seller is subject cannot
be fully determined until the extent or area of choice of his buyers is
also investigated. The Report points out that before the element of
choice open to buyers of a product in shifting their purchases to a substitute product can be considered, the substitute "must be actually competitive." But what is "competitive?" Here consensus was lacking
among the members of the committee.

The Report states: "Most members would simply emphasize, however, that more than a limited number of buyers should be able within
reasonable variations in prices to buy either the product or the substitute, for both commodities to be considered in the same market for
Sherman Act purposes...."52
The Report notes that in the Columbia Steel case53 "the relevant
market was differently defined for each product affected...."54 The
problem raised by the United Shoe Machinery case55 in this connection
is not discussed. Under one tabulation in that case, the percentage of
use by shoe manufacturers of defendant's machines ranged from 48
percent to 100 percent, depending on the kind of machine involved.
Under another tabulation, the percentage ranged from 41 percent to
I 00 percent. In general, the machines performed different functions
and hence were not substitutes for one another. Yet for purposes of
5 2 lli!PoRT 47, quoting with approval from Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594 at 612, n. 31, 73 S.Ct. 872 (1953): "For every product, substitutes
exist. But a relevant market cannot meaningfully encompass that infinite range. The
circle must be drawn narrowly to exclude any other product' to which, within reasonable
variations in price, only a limited number of buyers will turn; in technical terms, products
whose 'cross-elasticities of demand' are small." For a criticism of this quotation, see RE.PORT
47, n. 168.
·
63 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 68 S.Ct. 1107 (1948).
64 REPORT 45.
65 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., (D.C. Mass. 1953) 110 F. Supp.
295, affd. per curiam 347 U.S. 521, 74 S.Ct. 699 (1954).
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decision the court arrived at an average which it found to be under
United's control of "75 plus percentage of the shoe machinery market
which United serves."56 The market chosen for purposes of decision
was thus a class of buyers functionally defined or an industry rather
than a class of buyers defined in relation to a product for which there
was no ready substitute. The writer has elsewhere commented on the
result in this case that it is comparable to a finding that a defendant
who had control of 40 percent of the sales of com and 100 percent of
the sales of wheat in a commodity market in which both were sold
would have control of such commodity market to the extent of 70 percent, the average of the two. 57
A number of cases dealing with limited geographical markets are
noted in the Report but the criteria upon which the geographical configuration of a market may become critical for Sherman Act purposes
are not elaborated.58 The relevant criteria would seem to include such
questions as whether the defendant's conduct had injuriously affected
other sellers whose markets were in fact geographically limited, whether
transportation costs were critical in preventing invasion of local markets, or whether defendant's conduct itself had as its primary purpose
the object of creating a barrier against penetration of a local market by
competitors.

16. Section 2 of the act applies to offenses affecting "any part of
the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations." An unlawful monopolization, therefore, involves control over
an identifiable market which constitutes an appreciable part of commerce. Whether a vertical integration is illegal under section 2 depends upon the extent to which market competition is restrained; it
does not depend upon the volume of business done by the company
which is integrated independently of its relation to the market. (pp.
47-48)
Comment. The Report briefly touches upon a question of statutory construction raised by section 2. It is whether the fact that section
2 applies to offenses affecting "any part of the trade or commerce among
110 F. Supp. 295 at 343.
"Tests and Evidence of Monopoly under the Sherman Act: a Restatement," University of Michigan, Summer Institute, F.BDERAL .ANn-rnoST LAws 1953, 16
at 26 (1954).
5 8 REPORT 45, 48, discussing Indiana Farmer's Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie
Farmer Publishing Co., 293 U.S. 268, 55 S.Ct. 182 (1934); United States v. Columbia
Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 68 S.Ct. 1107 (1948); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332
U.S. 218, 67 S.Ct. 1560 (1947); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., (6th Cir.
1898) 85 F. 271.
56

57 Carlston,
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the several States, or with foreign nations" means that the words "any
part" exclude the concept of the market and permit section 2 to apply
merely to an amount of business sufficient in volume to overcome the
objection of de minimus. The Report rejects this suggestion and adopts
the position that the concept of the market "is integral to the basic
concept of 'monopolization,' and the ideas of competition and monopoly
on which it rests. Thus, section 2 of the Sherman Act deals with
monopolizations affecting markets which constitute 'any part' of the
trade or commerce covered by the Act."119
The distinction of an "appreciable part of interstate commerce"
advanced in the Yellow Cab case60 is discussed in the light of the
Columbia Steel case,61 with the comment that "this concept of the
market cannot be invoked whenever competition is excluded for a substantial volume of business, as in ordinary cases of vertical integration.
Their legality does not turn on the intentional monopolization of the
business of the company integrated. This would make all vertical
integration illegal under section 2. Instead, the legality of integration
rests on the extent to which analysis reveals that market competition
is restrained." 62
The essentiality of the concept of the market to section 2 cases is
pointed out with the remark that: "Without a finding as to the market
involved, there is no way of determining whether or not the defendants
have a given degree of market power."63

17. "To determine whether monopoly power exists, courts scrutinize market structure and behavior bearing on control over price and
competitive opportunity." (p. 49) Monopoly power "need not necessarily be associated with any given or fixed degree of market occupancy
but may in some circumstances stem from some other strategic position
in the market" creating a power to control the competitive opportunity
of rivals. The "defendants' power over the interrelated elements of
supply, price and entry" in the market must be considered and
weighed. (p. 54)
Comment. The Report incisively goes to the heart of the question
of the extent of market power needed to constitute monopoly by laying
it down that it is a question of "the extent to which competition from
other market suppliers effectively limits the discretion of defend69 REPORT 47.
60 United States
61 United States
62 Rl;poRT 48.
63

Jbid.

v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 at 225, 67 S.Ct. 1560 (1947).
v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 68 S.Ct. 1107 (1948).
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ants ...." This discretion involves the "degree of power over market
price, or over competitors' entry...." 64 The determination of whether
such power exists in a prohibited degree is a product of a wide-scale
inquiry into (1) the percentage of supply controlled, though the "relative effect of percentage command of a market varies with the setting
in which that factor is placed/' 65 (2) "market structure;' including "the
relative size and the strength of competitors (e.g., that the share of
market occupied by defendant or defendants has been increasing or
decreasing); freedom of entry (including reference to such factors as
capital requirements, locational advantages, and the importance of advertising); 'consumer demands,'" and (3) "market ... behavior bearing on control over price and competitive opportunity," including "the
way prices are actually formed and decisions made" and "the course or
prices, their flexibility and relation to price trends in other industries;
price competition among :6.rms; the presence or absence of trade customs tending to reduce price competition." 66 The Report concludes:
"Measuring monopoly power depends upon a full evaluation of the
market and its functioning, to determine whether on balance the defendants' power over the interrelated elements of supply, price and
entry are sufficiently great to be classed as monopoly power. While the
decisions illuminate the economic theory of the courts in evaluating
these facts, they provide no magic formula for simplifying the inquiry. "67 A rather extended discussion of the relevant cases provides a
background against which the foregoing analysis may be viewed and
weighed. 68
18. Unlawful monopoly exists when the prohibited degree of
monopoly power exists under a single control and is coupled. with the
purpose or intent to exercise it. (p. 55)
Comment. "Purpose or intent," as used in proposition 18 as well
as proposition 13, is to be "sharply differentiated from the proof of
'speci:6.c' intent to monopolize required where the charge is an unreal64 Ibid.
65 United

States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 at 528, 68 S.Ct. 1107 (1948).
49-50.
54.
68 United States v. United States Steel Co., 251 U.S. 417, 40 S.Ct. 293 (1920);
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 66 S.Ct. 1125 (1946); United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 68 S.Ct. 915 (1948); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416; United States v. Pullman
Co., (D.C. Pa. 1943) 50 F. Supp. 123; United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,
(D.C. Mass. 1953) 110 F. Supp. 295, affd. per curiam 347 U.S. 521, 74 S.Ct. 699
(1954). Certain doctrinal differences appear in the discussion of the United States Steel
case, REPORT 51-52.
66 REPORT
67 REPORT
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ized attempt to monopolize. . . . The history and business policy of a
monopoly have a distinct bearing on the proof of 'deliberateness,' as
distinguished from 'specific intent' .... Often the courts will infer that
a monopoly position has been 'deliberately' maintained in this sense as
a matter of 'objective' rather than 'subjective' intent, relying on business
practice to support the conclusion that men intend the natural consequences of their acts." 69
Question may be raised whether the element of deliberateness, as
a requirement for the offense of monopolizing when the proof has
established the requisite degree of market power, is merely a formal·
requirement. If, as the Report itself notes, "no showing of intent is
required beyond 'the mere intent to do the act' " 70 (i.e., "where the
defendant or defendants have actual monopoly power"), it would
appear that, as Judge Hand states, the "distinction is ... purely formal"
inasmuch as "the power and its exercise must needs coalesce."71
19. Monopoly achieved by conduct lawful in itself may become
illegal monopoly if such conduct were shaped by purposes to discourage, exclude or prevent the rise of competitors. (pp. 56-60)

Comment. Wh~n a new rule is laid down by a court, its architect
must consider its implications and possible applications and seek to
frame its terms so as to regulate in the desired manner all its foreseeable
consequences. In the Alcoa case Judge Hand envisaged the possibility
that a strictly logical application of the doctrine there laid down for the
first time might be applied to punish a defendant possessing the prohibited degree of market power but otherwise guiltless of any wrongful
conduct. Among the possibilities of such a situation arising, he foresaw
that market demand might be so small that only a single large plant
could economically supply it, that changes in market demand might
drive out all but one producer, or that one company out of a number
might survive because of its superior skill, foresight and industry.
These types of excusable monopoly may be categorized as cases where
a defendant has had monopoly "thrust upon it." 72 In exploring the
issue whether Alcoa was under this theory excused from a violation of
section 2, Judge Hand made certain remarks which have engendered
much debate and confusion. He concluded that Alcoa's conduct did
55-56.
56, citing and quoting from United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
(2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416 at 432.
11 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416 at
428.
12 Id. at 429.
69 REPORT
70 REPORT

1955]

BASIC ANTITRUST CONCEPTS

1055

not bring it under the suggested exception, that it was not "the passive
beneficiary of a monopoly, following upon an involuntary elimination
of competitors by automatically operative economic forces. . . . It was
not inevitable that it should always anticipate increases in the demand
for ingot and be prepared to supply them. . . . It insists that it never
excluded competitors; but we can think of no more effective exclusion
than progressively to embrace each new opportunity as it opened, and
to face every newcomer with new capacity already geared into a great
organization, having the advantage of experience, trade connections
and the elite of personnel. Only in case we interpret 'exclusion' as
limited to manoeuvres not honestly industrial, but actuated solely by
a desire to prevent competition, can such a course, indefatigably pursued, be deemed not 'exclusionary.' " 73 (Italics are supplied in the
above quotation in order to indicate the source of certain reasoning in
the United Shoe Machinery case discussed below.)
The phrase "we can think of no more effective exclusion than
progressively to embrace each new opportunity as it opened" may or
may not indicate conduct which should fall outside the indicated exception. Judge Hand felt that it should, presumably for the reason
that, even though it was conduct which was otherwise -lawful and
might in another setting even be laudable, in the case before him it
was not conduct responsive to competitive pressures but designed to
prevent such pressures from arising. It was not conduct part of a lawful main purpose but conduct primarily selected to accomplish an unlawful purpose.
The United Shoe Machinery case must be read against this background. United was found to possess the prohibited degree of monopoly power in the market which it served. This fact and "other factors"
were held to result in a violation of section 2. Such "other factors"
were the circumstances that United had pursued business "practices
not economically inevitable" or not "honestly industrial." 74
A concept thus negatively expressed may be difficult for less sophisticated courts to administer and may in future cases lead to some
subjective or individualistic applications. Nevertheless, the concept is
consistent with the fundamental basis of the Rule of Reason that conduct must always be viewed as a part of the total situation in which
decisions resulting in such conduct are made and that, as the horizon
of such situations enlarges, conduct which may be lawful becomes un•
1s Id. at 430-431.

,
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., (D.C. Mass. 1953) 110 F. Supp.
295 at 344, 345, affd. per curiam, 347 U.S. 521, 74 S.Ct. 699 (1954).
14
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lawful as a means to a forbidden end, or conduct which may be by
itself unlawful may become lawful when it is carried out in an incidental manner to accomplish a lawful end and when its consequences
are not, therefore, those which the rule of illegality in question was
designed to prevent. The writer has elsewhere suggested that these
developments under the Alcoa and United Shoe Machinery cases may
in reality reflect the emergence of a special rule of law for the business
£.rm possessing or sharing substantial market power. To such a £.rm,
competitive behavior privileged as to the small £.rm may be denied. It
must, in short, confine its market practices to those of pure price competition-however elusive may be the content of that concept in its
judicial application.
20. When "monopoly power has been achieved through combination or conspiracy, Section 2 has been violated without more. 'Intent
and purpose to exercise that power' is proved by the fact of combination or conspiracy." (p. 61)

Comment. The condemnation of a monopoly in. the hands of a
single seller is a condemnation of a condition or result which the law
considers to be harmful to the economy. Yet, as we have noted above,
section 2 will not permit such a condemnation to be made without at
least satisfying the formal requirement of "deliberateness" discussed
under propositions 12, 13 and 18 above. When, however, monopoly
is achieved by combination, the law is concerned with the means as
well as the end. In such a case, the fact that monopoly power was
achieved in such a manner itself creates the necessary inference of
"intent and purpose to exercise that power."75
21. In order to establish the illegality of (1) an attempt to monopolize or (2) a combination or conspiracy to monopolize when monopoly
power was not achieved, proof is required of a specific or subjective
intent to accomplish an unlawful result. (p. 61)

Comment. When monopoly power is sought through attempt or
conspiracy but is not in fact achieved, section 2 requires proof of a
specific or subjective intent to accomplish an unlawful result. The act
is penal in nature and when it is applied to conduct which does not
involve the commission of the prohibited offense of monopolizing itself
but, instead, attempts or conspiracies to monopolize, proof of deliberate
75 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 at 809, 66 S.Ct. 1125
(1946).
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purpose to accomplish the prohibited result is necessary. 76 The Report
states: "When the acts are done by a single firm, proof of intent may
be established in the normal way-by contemporaneous documents,
industrial background, and the like--with no single factor controlling."77 In the merger cases, a specific intent to monopolize is not
shown when the only motivating circumstances shown are a deliberate
intent to control the acquired company's policies. Evidence would be
required that the acquisition "was part of a larger plan for gaining
monopoly power by a series of mergers before the acquisition could have
been condemned as part of an unlawful attempt under Section 2." 78

Meaning of "Trade or Commerce Among the Several States"
22. The term "trade or commerce" as used in sections I and 2 of
the act "is not limited to economic activities involving the production
and physical movement of goods. Thus banking, insurance, finance,
the business of conducting hospitals and making organized provision
for medical care all may come within its scope." (pp. 62-63) A restraint
of trade taking place within a state but nevertheless having an interstate effect may fall under the act. (p. 64)
. Comment. The Report appears to adopt the philosophy, in appraising the scope of the term "trade or commerce among the several States,"
as used in the Sherman Act, that "commerce is a term of the largest
import" 79 and that "any agreement or combination which ... regulates
interstate commerce to that extent and to the same extent trenches
upon the power of the national legislature and violates the statute."80
The Report states that the term "trade or commerce" includes "all sorts
of economic activities, so long as the requisite interstate effect is found."
It "is not limited to . . . the production and physical movement of
goods," but extends to such diverse activities as ''banking, insurance,
finance, the business of conducting hospitals and making organized
provision for medical care. . . ."81 It even extends to local restraints
formally of an intrastate character which in fact have an interstate
effect. 82
76 Swttt & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 48 S.Ct. 311 (1928), is cited in the
Report at p. 61 as authority for this proposition but it appears to relate to consent decrees
under the Sherman Act.
77 REPORT 61-62.
78 REPORT 62, citing United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 68 S.Ct.
1107 (1948).
79 Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 at 280 (1875).
80 Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, l 75 U.S. 211 at 242, 20 S.Ct. 96
(1899).
81 REPORT 62-63.
8 2 Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 68

1058

MmmcAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 53

Conclusions

The studies presented in this issue of the Review, as well as an
examination of the contents of the Report itself, reveal an extraordinary
accomplishment of the judicial process at work in the development by
the courts of the body of antitrust doctrine. Ever sensitive to the values
of our democratic, free enterprise society, carefully exploring the functioning of our enormously complex, industrial economy, feeling their
way step by step under a statute which was primarily declaratory of a
policy rather than enunciative of a set of regulations, the courts have
in six and a half decades produced a body of law of very considerable
magnitude. The administration of the Sherman Act and its supplementary legislation known generally as our antitrust laws could have
played havoc in our economy had it been in less able and responsible
hands. It is true that there have been errors as well as successes in this
total process of trial and error. The Report reveals consensus on a
number of asserted errors and for its forthrightness- ·the members of the
committee will doubtless be attacked and on a level otherwise than
that of scientific debate.
The functioning of the committee is believed to be a notable example of group research and inquiry making its contribution to the administration of justice. A substantial number of experts of varying
viewpoints and typ~ of training and experience were drawn together
in a group which set for itself the goal of making a dispassionate study
of the administration of our antitrust laws and workable and acceptable
recommendations for their improvement. To the reaching of this goal
the members of the committee became more and more committed as
its work went on. A common consciousness of the ~eaning of the role
of committee membership emerged. The product of the committee's
work reveals that in the performance of this role attitudes of the advocate as shaped by his current professional responsibilities were supplanted by a desire to make the work of the committee a real contribution to the betterment of the functioning of our competitive system.
It is the writer's prediction that even if the committee's recommendations should not eventuate in legislation, the clarity and exactness of
its analysis and the intrinsic persuasiveness and authority of its statements will have a continuing and substantial effect in the adjustment
of antitrust controversy both in and out of our courts.
S.Ct. 996 (1948); United States v. Employing Lathers Assn. of Chicago, 347 U.S. 198,
74 S.Ct. 455 (1954).

